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Europe’s capacity to explore the envisaged pathways that achieve its near- and long-term energy and
climate objectives needs to be significantly enhanced. In this perspective, we discuss how this capacity is
supported by energy and climate-economy models, and how international modelling teams are organ-
ised within structured communication channels and consortia as well as coordinate multi-model ana-
lyses to provide robust scientific evidence. Noting the lack of such a dedicated channel for the highly
active yet currently fragmented European modelling landscape, we highlight the importance of trans-
parency of modelling capabilities and processes, harmonisation of modelling parameters, disclosure of
input and output datasets, interlinkages among models of different geographic granularity, and
employment of models that transcend the highly harmonised core of tools used in model inter-
comparisons. Finally, drawing from the COVID-19 pandemic, we discuss the need to expand the
modelling comfort zone, by exploring extreme scenarios, disruptive innovations, and questions that
transcend the energy and climate goals across the sustainability spectrum. A comprehensive and
comprehensible multi-model framework offers a real example of “collective” science diplomacy, as an
instrument to further support the ambitious goals of the EU Green Deal, in compliance with the EU claim
to responsible research.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).).
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The global energy and climate agenda has been progressing fast,
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governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has also been
through significant challenges, including among others the recent
rise to power of narratives that have been hostile towards energy
transitions and climate action [2] and to some extent impeding
international efforts; or the COVID-19 global health emergency [3]
and associated recovery efforts looming large over policy prioriti-
sation [4].
Nonetheless, the European Union (EU) has consistently taken a
leading role in international climate policy [5] throughout, adopt-
ing relevant strategies in as early as 1992, and currently pushing
forward an ambitious Green Deal to achieve climate neutrality by
2050 [6]. But, despite its ambition and current success in achieving
most 2020 goals, the EU is not on easy track to meet its 2030
climate and energy targets [7]. This diverging trajectory is
frequently attributed to governance issues [8] and challenges of
monitoring nature [9]: the submission of a collective, supranational
set of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) at the EU level
requires that collective targets be appropriately disaggregated at
the national level, as well as that Member States live up to their
national commitments and that the Community successfully
monitor progress made at both scales. So far, strong discrepancies
have been observed among Member States [10]. These inter alia
include renewable support schemes, bottlenecks in transmission
lines, societal resistance levels, fossil fuel lock-ins, progress in en-
ergy efficiency, and prioritisation of the climate agenda, as well as
misalignment of National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) with
collective targets, as reflected in the EU action pledges to the
UNFCCC. European capacity to explore the envisaged pathways to
achieve its near- and long-term climate and energy objectives,
therefore, needs to be significantly enhanced.
In this perspective, we briefly discuss how this capacity is sup-
ported by models, and how international modelling teams are
organised within dedicated consortia and coordinate multi-model
analyses to provide robust scientific evidence. We note the lack of
such a structured communication channel for the diverse and
highly active, yet currently fragmented, European modelling land-
scape and review the necessary steps to delivering comprehensive
and comprehensible modelling exercises. We highlight the impor-
tance of transparency of modelling capabilities and processes,
harmonisation of modelling (socioeconomic, technoeconomic,
emission, and policy) parameters, full disclosure of input and
output datasets, interlinkages among models of different
geographic granularity, as well as employment of models that
transcend the highly harmonised group of IAMs, in model inter-
comparison exercises. Finally, drawing from the COVID-19
pandemic, we discuss the need to expand the modelling comfort
zone, by exploring extreme scenarios, disruptive innovations, and
questions across the sustainability spectrum. Progress on all these
fronts will ensure that modelling is established as a critically useful
tool to support the complexities of policy and decisions around
rapid decarbonisation of Europe in the coming years.
2. Simulating the future: models, international consortia, and
inter-comparisons
The design of a multi-dimensional set of policy instruments and
measures of technological, economic, and legislative nature that
altogether comprise the European energy and climate policy
agenda is supported by an equally diverse set of energy system,
sectoral and climate-economy modelling activities [11]. Integrated
assessment modelling (IAM) exercises constitute the backbone of
numerous research and innovation projects [12], aimed at assessing
how specific actions can steer the world, including Europe, towards
climate neutrality goals, by embracing the complex interplay2
between energy, economy, and environment [13].
These modelling frameworks have undoubtedly contributed to
both knowledge and policy, but the extent to which they have
decisively helped policymakers and supported effective gover-
nance of climate policy has long been debated (e.g. Ref. [14]).
Models have been criticised over being detached from policy-
makers [15], featuring inflexibility to represent the diversity of
policy instruments and the national focus [16], displaying limited
interconnectivity among the represented subsystems [17], having
little capacity to assess different types of uncertainty [18], or being
opaque about modelling mechanisms and assumptions. Further-
more, emerging criticisms focus on technological representation:
for example, despite the significant role of renewable energy and
negative emissions technologies in a low-carbon future [19,20],
many studies have questioned the realism of modelled scenarios
[21,22], or highlighted current modelling limitations in adequately
representing demand-flexibility, energy storage, interconnection or
other flexibility required to promote penetration of renewables
[23], leading to compromising modelling assumptions [24] or
calling for higher resolution capacity [25,26] that incurs impractical
computational costs [27], respectively. And, although the knowl-
edge produced is contingent on the modelling perspective and
carries meaning in the scientific discourse, it is nonetheless used in
policy, business, and other processes outside the boundaries of the
modelling world [28].
In addressing these challenges, voices within the scientific
community have been calling for transformations towards a new
generation of advanced modelling frameworks [23] and comple-
mentarities with other analytical approaches [29]. These voices
have been heard, as reflected in a series of new, ongoing research
initiatives funded by the European Commission (EC), like LOCO-
MOTION1 or NAVIGATE2 and PARIS REINFORCE3 or ENGAGE,4
respectively. But, as the envisaged energy transitions in Europe
and worldwide require radical socioeconomic, technological,
institutional, and structural changes [30] in energy supply and
demand [31], there is an ever-pressing need for a diversified set of
strongly coordinated modelling approaches, with collectively
improved capacity and detail, to support the development and use
of plural knowledge in this field. Following climate modellers’
example, IAM researchers have been trying to enhance robustness
and consistency of resulting policy prescriptions by instigating
model inter-comparison projects [32]. These constitute exercises
aimed at addressing specific research questions based on numerous
models of different theory, structure, approach, and coverage [33].
Major model inter-comparison studies have been organised and
successfully carried out in the context of recent EC-funded projects,
like ADVANCE [34] or CD-LINKS [35], essentially forming the
bedrock of the recent IPCC 1.5 C Special Report [36]. In coordi-
nating such efforts, energy system and climate-economymodelling
teams have been organised in international, multilateral commu-
nication initiatives and consortia. Among these initiatives, Stan-
ford’s Energy Modeling Forum (EMF)5 has the longest history and
reputation of conducting multi-model exercises with a thematic
(e.g. Refs. [37]) or regional focus (e.g. Ref. [38]), and bridging the
policy-science gap [39]. The Integrated Assessment Modeling
Consortium (IAMC)6 was later developed to coordinate research
activities within the IAM community and convene the process of
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[40], including the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) [41] and
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) [42]. Motivated by
EMF and IAMC, regional efforts have been mobilised, like the China
Energy Modeling Forum (CEMF), which recently published its first
inter-comparison results [43].
But, while numerous EU research projects have also oriented on
or eventually producedmodel inter-comparison exercises, inter alia
contributing to major assessments like ADAM [44], AMPERE [24]
and LIMITS [45] in IPCC AR5, there currently is no structured,
multilateral communication among European integrated assess-
ment modellers, and between them and other stakeholders, as is
the case for the global scene and other regions. Even the Energy
Modelling Platform for Europe (EMP-E)7 [46] is supported by some
EC-funded projects and orients only on energy system modelling.
Hundreds of climate-economy energy, electricity, and sectoral
models have been established in the literature [47e49] and used
across research and innovation projects, for the purposes of un-
derpinning climate and energy policy. This is also evident in the
number of literature reviews on modelling frameworks (e.g.
Ref. [50]) as well as the different scope and focus of each of these
reviews (e.g. Refs. [51,52]). This diversity is embedded in the range
of scientific disciplines and methodologies involved in their
development and use. It reflects that no single model can cover the
broad spectrum of issues relevant to policymaking, like effort
sharing under the Paris Agreement principles [53,54], synergistic
effects across policies corresponding to different sustainability di-
mensions [55], quantification of costs associated with realistically
covering the gaps between cumulative NDC contributions and
1.5 C trajectories [9], realistic interpretation of the potential of
negative emissions technologies [56], and so on. But, despite the
high proliferation of modelling tools designed to cover vastly
different or similar aspects in varying levels of detail, it is a
consistent core of highly harmonised global models that have
dominated the literature [57]. Model inter-comparison projects
based on these models have long been used as justification of
exploring a broad part of the future possibility space, but may end
up hampering policy action [1], showing huge ranges of outcomes
without elaborating in detail the origins of these ranges.
To help policymakers act in the face of such huge possibility sets,
the modelling world should start investigating whether a more
diversified portfolio of modelling tools can answer specific ques-
tions through targeted sensitivity or stochastic parameter pertur-
bations, to identify genuinely robust patterns of mitigation, whilst
exploring a genuinely large possibility space [58]. As different types
of modelling structure focus on specific sectors/aspects thereby
offering different types of insights, establishing connections be-
tween models that deploy different methodologies and structures
in multi-model analyses can produce better, more robust policy
prescriptions [59], in contrast to individual modelling exercises
[60]. This is why effective climate policy must be underpinned by
modelling ensembles that altogether draw from different struc-
tures and methodologies, provide insights for different geographic
scales, as well as cover in detail all economic sectors, represent
different types of policies, and provide insights for the broad range
of greenhouse gases and aerosols, thereby capturing the multi-
plicity of aspects of climate-economy interactions and enlightening
the origin of uncertainties and ranges by means of inter-
comparison projects.7 http://www.energymodellingplatform.eu/.
3
3. Comprehensiveness and comprehensibility
The motivation driving international consortia can be sum-
marised in four principles. These begin from the fundamental basis
that decision support is effective when (a) addressing targeted
policy and research questions, and (b) when no single perspective is
favoured over others. More importantly, they extend to the need of
data being (c) open and comprehensive, requiring assumptions,
parameters, data sources, and uncertainty sensitivities be fully
disclosed; and produced knowledge being (d) comprehensible,
with downloadable datasets, customisable visualisations, and
detailed and focused policy prescriptions. This is contrary to the
norm of crisp data decoupled from the assumptions driving
modelling runs and detached from the policy context and under-
standing, as well as of graphs labelled with naming conventions
that probably mean nothing outside a core group of modelling
experts.
These principles mean more than facilitating knowledge ex-
change among modellers and extend to involving non-experts into
the scientific processes, since complex societal challenges imply
multidimensional trade-offs and require science diplomacy, i.e.
coordinated action of vastly different stakeholders and, across na-
tions, scales and discourses [61]. Corresponding political choices
must be based on thorough analyses of the complex interactions;
and stakeholders need to trust said analyses. Otherwise, policy and
other decision makers will adopt inefficiently low levels of trust in
the modelling results and associated policy/decisions. Successful
decarbonisation dictates that the modelling community interact
with science’s end-users in industry, government, and civil society,
and develop strategies that transcend their traditional disciplinary
boundaries [62], thereby incorporating political and societal re-
alities [63] spanning all sectors of industry, government, and soci-
ety, and producing recommendations to be trusted by a majority of
stakeholders within the climate science-policy interface [64].
Involving all relevant stakeholders is aligned with the concept of
responsible science [65], promoting socially acceptable, robust, and
sustainable transitions, and is proven to increase the level of trust
on both ends [66], while helping make modelling findings both
intelligible in terms of real-world implications and actionable in
terms of concrete recommendations.
Dating back decades [14], however, a growing concern associ-
ated with climate- and energy-economy modelling tools orbits on
their legitimacy: why should scenario users, i.e. policymakers and
other decision makers using modelling insights in decision pro-
cesses [67], have confidence in modelling outputs, and in what
levels [68]? As also reflected in one of the four scientific working
groups of the IAMC, the modelling community has lately attempted
to respond to such concerns: diagnostic indicators [69] and eval-
uation methods [70] have been defined for IAMs, efforts have been
made to document models in less technical language (e.g. the
ADVANCE/IAMC8 and the openmod initiative9 wiki pages), and
research initiatives have been carried out to improve model
development, evaluation and inter-comparisons (e.g. Ref. [71]). And
yet little progress can be claimed [72] in opening the black box [73]
to the extent of non-experts’ acknowledging inputs and showing
trust in outputs of modelling processes [9].
Among relevant efforts, the I2AM PARIS platform10 includes
concise, dynamic summaries of this documentation by mapping
these capabilities in interactive infographics, towards boosting
understanding and ownership among non-expert audiences. These8 https://www.iamcdocumentation.eu/index.php/IAMC_wiki.
9 https://wiki.openmod-initiative.org/wiki/Main_Page.
10 http://paris-reinforce.epu.ntua.gr/main.
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multiplicity and diversity of models with one another, for all au-
diences to appreciate why each model can be used to address
specific policy questions. Documentation of model characteristics
and capabilities will also enable scientists from different disciplines
and viewpoints to share a common language. Before stakeholders
own why modelling tools can be trusted to address each question,
any attempt to promote legitimacy must also entail transparency of
the knowledge production process. This goes beyond using open
source tools and implies that scientists develop and implement
open protocols for interpreting scenarios and parameters, harmo-
nising datasets of input sources across models in multi-model an-
alyses, defining diagnostics indicators, and designing shared
formats for documenting outputs.
Technical improvement of technoeconomic and socioeconomic
representation in models is a good starting point, yet insufficient in
ensuring robustness of resulting trajectories, if the datasets driving
the simulations that lead to specific policy recommendations are
not fully disclosed. Simply looking under the hood of modelling
tools and exercises [74] says little if these datasets are not author-
itative and shared within the modelling community, as is the case
of a few major socioeconomic parameters [75]. Efforts must be put
into defining each socioeconomic, technoeconomic and historical
emissions parameter (glossary, units, definition) and their data
sources (organisation, time span, database), towards harmonising
inputs across models, for given questions, so that outcomes can be
tied to modelling assumptions, and the broad spectrum of cross-
scale insights across boundaries and disciplines can be effectively
communicated [76].
Furthermore, not much progress has hitherto been done to
ensure that those involved in scenario design are fully aware of
whether their motivation and intentions are reflected in the pro-
duced knowledge, upon communication to policy and society, or
whether their scenarios are indeed linked to the research and so-
cietal needs [54,77]. Except for high media coverage cases [78], lack
of guidance from modellers renders scenarios prone to mis-
conceptions and distortions in their interpretation by external
users [79]. During the last decade, literature, as reflected in major
scientific assessments and consortia, has been swarmed by thou-
sands of scenarios, many of which may have been developed and
modelled on the basis of scientists’ interpretations of scenarios that
they themselves perceive as useful [80]. There appears to be
misinterpretation of scenarios, not only in policy but also among
scientists and experienced users of these scenarios [81]. This
interpretation-driven production of knowledge partly explains why
for example SSP2 [82], narrating an extrapolation of historical
trends in the future, has been applied significantly more than other
socioeconomic scenarios, with hundreds of studies featuring its
combination with selected RCPs. It also means that no scenario or
modelling exercise is necessarily meaningful. For example, specific
SSP-RCP combinations are presumed implausible and yet count
hundreds of recent studies, with RCP8.5 being in principle incon-
sistent with most SSPs [83,84]. Despite the clock ticking the win-
dow of opportunity for climate action away, it could take years of
modelling work to validate or invalidate these scenarios along the
way [85], unless a more pragmatic evaluation of scenarios, or
outputs [86,87], is carried out. Recent qualitative efforts, for
example, include applying a risk lens coupled with different
methodologies (e.g. Ref. [88]) or enabling expert elicitation that
reflects policy perspectives of what can go right or wrong in the
future [89].
Acknowledging these challenges, the European and interna-
tional modelling community must put significant effort into
ensuring that their scenario frameworks match the policy needs at
all levels and address the actual research capacity needed. For4
Europe, in particular, employing and coupling integrated assess-
ment models with EU-wide representation and models with more
detailed granularity, at the Member State or sub-national (e.g.
NUTS-3 and NUTS-2) level [90,91], should be a core aim. Upon
streamlining research at different scales, which is critical to
bridging EU-wide and national-level modelling analyses and poli-
cymaking, coordination among different research projects must be
enhanced, providing improved scientific basis for multi-model and/
or inter-comparison exercises. Among others, this first requires
harmonisation of data inputs across models regardless of theory,
including socioeconomic and technoeconomic parameters, fossil
fuel prices, and historical emissions, with data source selection
driven by reliability and consistency of the assumptions at all
scales. Assumptions shared across policy pledges must be consid-
ered, making use of the best available science, including matching
global datasets [92,93] and their national-level disaggregation, e.g.
on the human [94], urbanisation [95] and economic dimensions
[96], without overlooking the associated localisation and down-
scaling challenges potentially leading to several-fold increases of
plausible futures [97].
Fostering inter-comparison projects that are globally and
regionally meaningful finally requires a harmonised interpretation
of actual climate policies for the EU and other countries (NDC level)
and for national action pledges within the EU (NECP level), despite
potential differences across pledges in terms of target type, base
year, and horizon. Significant progress was made in the CD-LINKS
project [98], contributing to capacity building for national model-
ling teams; as the climate agenda progresses fast, modellers must
ramp up efforts to ensure up-to-date representation of both current
policies and future action pledges worldwide. This will allow for
model inter-comparison exercises, where models provide a more
robust response to research needs and where differences among
trajectories resulting from different models can be attributed to
their specificities alone [99]. Efforts must also be put into clearly
exploring the scope of modelling interlinkages, by defining capacity
for data exchange, and enabling integration of models; by
combining, for example, long-range IAMs with short-term models
of the macro-economy, useful insights can be gleaned on the full
range of potential impacts of shocks, such as COVID-19 and asso-
ciated policy and societal responses [100].
4. Expanding the modelling comfort zone: disruptions,
extremes, and sustainability
The policy and market responses to the coronavirus pandemic
led to temporary reductions of emissions, which have been com-
parable to the annual decrease rates that are in turn compliant with
the Paris Agreement [101]. Discussions have focused on govern-
ments’ efforts to recover, make up for lost economic ground and
even push towards rebounds with even higher emission pathways
compared to pre-pandemic trajectories, with implications for
progress in climate action. This pandemic reminds us of the need to
actively engage with extreme events [102], which may not be part
of typical scenarios underpinning mitigation strategies. Game-
changing disruptions may be positive or negative but, regardless
of the direction of their impact, it is critical that energy and inte-
grated assessment modelling encompass considerations of a large
range of possible events in the coming years and decades [103].
Failure to do so risks developingmitigation or adaptation plans that
do not pass the resilience test.
Example issues that modellers must seek to explore through the
deployment of a combination of appropriate modelling tools across
fit-for-purpose scenarios include the implications of services digi-
talisation on energy demand and supply, through considering
shifting consumer demand patterns [104], as well as electricity and
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smart and interconnected energy networks. But they should also
include energy citizenship and sustainable lifestyles as well as
economic shocks resulting, for example, from changing trade re-
lations, oil and other commodity price changes, or penetration of
artificial intelligence and robotics into manufacturing; and impli-
cations of rapid political and societal changes in sentiment towards
urgency of tackling the climate crisis, for example in response to
climate shocks, which raise the issue to the top of society’s agenda.
Moreover, there is a critical need to reflect on the technological
progress that confounded all expectations over the last decade,
particularly concerning the cost reductions andmarket penetration
of solar PV, wind, and electric vehicles, as well as battery electric
storage. Other such technological innovation “miracles” (be they in
ultra-cheap and scalable amines for CO2 capture and atmospheric
removal, or electrolysers for hydrogen production) are almost
inevitable in the coming years. Modelling activities, which fail to
explore the plausible extremes of cost reductions in such technol-
ogies, will be redundant or misleading in the face of these inevi-
table breakthroughs.
Finally, although mostly remembered for the Paris Agreement,
the year 2015 also featured the UN-wide adoption of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, embodied in 17 distinct yet
highly intertwined Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These
inter alia include poverty and hunger elimination, social and gender
equalities, quality education and decent work, strong institutions
and responsible production, environmental and biodiversity pro-
tection, good health, and climate action. Seemingly two separate
agendas, sustainable development and climate action are highly
intertwined [55]: the former is an explicit part of the Paris Agree-
ment, while the latter constitutes one of the seventeen goals. The
need to assess climate action in conjunction with the other SDGs
has in the literature been addressed mostly by means of treating
SDGs as trade-offs of low-carbon mitigation pathways [105], either
explicitly (e.g. Ref. [106,107]) or implicitly (e.g. Ref. [108]). But,
despite having been designed and/or adapted to support climate
policy, integrated assessment modelling frameworks have been
found well-equipped to deal with most other goals of sustainable
development [109]. As such, the modelling community must
instead place climate action in the entire framework of sustainable
development, by exploring co-benefits of working across the broad
sustainability spectrum. Dealing with sustainable development
questions that transcend the boundaries of global, EU, or national
climate action can contribute to exploring decarbonisation path-
ways that are beneficial from multiple perspectives [110] and more
robust against different plausible futures [111].
5. Conclusions
In this perspective, we argue that the European modelling
community must start delivering information that is not only open
and comprehensive but also comprehensible and attached to spe-
cific questions, modelling assumptions, and multi-faceted un-
certainties, so as to restore stakeholders’ faith in modelling tools
[112]. This is especially true now, considering how science has in
the past failed to drive policy [113] or incidentally become adjunct
to political causes, as the COVID-19 policy response highlighted
[114]. Enhancing the science-policy interface should therefore be
underpinned within a structured and transparent communication
channel that designs and maintains protocols shared across the
scientific community as well as to tools, datasets, results, and an-
alyses that are open, clear, and useful for all stakeholders. This goes
well beyond opening data and software [115], developing detailed
interfaces between modelling tools [116], or providing policy-
makers with technical information [99]. It rather implies that5
knowledge be effectively transformed, tailored, and disseminated
in customised visualisations and convincing policy recommenda-
tions. It also goes beyond carrying inter-comparisons that treat
models as having attributes separate from the inputs and as-
sumptions on structure (e.g. Ref. [117]), or anchoring to the comfort
zone of exploring the well-established space of ‘unknowns’ [118].
It is about time the currently fragmented European modelling
landscape be brought together and coordinate its efforts in a
Europe-wide platform for energy- and climate-economy model-
ling. This should undoubtedly build on the knowledge produced by
the highly harmonised global IAMs dominating model inter-
comparisons for decades [57]; assessing EU policy in a global
context and in consideration of international cooperation is not
only key to resolving the global threat of climate change, but also
critical to understanding the contribution of other major emitters
to the international climate agenda [119] and to implementing the
European Green Deal [120]. But it should allow adding further in-
sights and layers of detail and granularity [121], reinforcing tech-
nical feasibility, viability, effectiveness, and robustness of transition
pathways at the European and national level, co-created with
stakeholders, thereby promoting responsible science and
enhancing science diplomacy, which constitute top priorities of the
EU research agenda. Only by doing so in a structured, transparent
and legitimate manner, will the European climate and energy
modelling landscape be able to host multi-model analyses with
appropriate geographic detail and sectoral diversity, and with the
capacity to highlight costs, benefits, impacts, and trade-offs at
different levels, as reflected in the policy discrepancies across EU
nations and the gaps between the sum of national strategies and
collective action [122]. And only then will it avoid being detached
from real-world policy needs [9] or featuring bias that can render it
lagging policy advancements [123].Credit author statement
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